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NOTE
RESPECTING INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED
PARENTS: A CALL FOR CHANGE IN STATE
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
STATUTES
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Mentally retarded persons ... are individuals whose abilities and

behavioral deficits can vary greatly depending on the degree of their
retardation, their life experience, and the ameliorative effects of
education and habilitation."' So spoke the Supreme Court in upholding
the death penalty for individuals who share the single commonality of a
low IQ. 2 Yet, despite this recognition by our country's highest court, that
the term "mentally retarded ' 3 does not define a distinct class, states
continue to view intellectually disabled people as a homogenous group
for the purpose of terminating parental rights. They are, in fact, a group
of people whose abilities may differ widely, especially in the area of
parental abilities.
Before an adjudication of termination of parental rights can be
made, 4 most state statutes require an initial showing that the parent is
1. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 306 (1989).
2. This decision was later overturned by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), in which
the court noted that, "[t]o the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally
retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded." Id. at 317.
3. This Note will use a variety of terms to describe what has historically been referred to as
"mentally retarded." Although there is not a consensus in either the social science or legal
community about which term best describes this group, the literature reflects a move away from the
negative connotations associated with the term "mentally retarded." See, e.g., AM. ASS'N ON
at http://www.aamr.org/AboutAAMR
STATEMENT,
MISSION
RETARDATION,
MENTAL
/mission statement.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2006) (intellectually disabled); Bette R. Keltner et al.,
Mothers with Intellectual Limitations and Their 2-Year-Old Children 's Developmental Outcomes,
24 J. INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITY 45, 45 (1999) (intellectual limitations). "Intellectually disabled" is
a better descriptive phrase because it focuses on intellectual capabilities instead of all mental
functions and properly categorizes the condition as a disability. Id.
4. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103 (2005). Entitled "Termination of Rights of Unfit
Parents," this statute states that once it has been determined that adoption is in the child's best
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"unfit.",5 Although

termination statutes do not offer a single definition of
unfitness, they often narrow the focus by listing the parental
characteristics or behaviors that are grounds for termination. Included in
these lists are parents who have murdered the child's other parent,
parents who have abandoned their child, and, in many jurisdictions,
parents who are mentally deficient, delayed, or retarded.6 While parents
who have murdered the child's other parent are likely categorically unfit
by any societal standard, intellectually disabled parents should not be
treated the same. Intellectually disabled parents should only be grouped
in such a category if they cannot care for their children and if their
disability is an immutable characteristic with an inherent connection to
child abuse and neglect. In fact, studies and cases have demonstrated
that neither of these assumptions is true.7 Both have shown that
cognitively delayed individuals can be good parents.8 Good parents
should not have their parental rights terminated.
Part II of this Note will describe and define intellectual disability,
looking at both the evolving understanding of it through time as well as
what remains less clear. This Part will also discuss the utility of an
"intellectually disabled" label versus the potentially prejudicial effects it
may have on an individual: specifically, a parent. Part III will discuss the
effects of mental disabilities on parenting, concluding that there is not a
clear link between a low IQ and an inability to parent. Part IV will
compare a sampling of state statutes detailing the requirements for a
termination of parental rights, concluding that mental deficiency should
not be a separate characteristic upon which a termination of parental
rights may be based. At most, it should be a factor in determining an
outcome that will most benefit the family as a whole. In accordance with
interests, the grounds listed in the statutes' subsections are the grounds for a termination of parental
rights. Presumably, if none of them are met, then the parent is not unfit and may not have her
parental rights terminated. Id.
5. Individual state statutes may use different terms to refer to this initial finding, although,

broadly categorized, all operate as synonyms of "unfit." See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-94(a)
(2005) ("parental misconduct or inability"); ALA. CODE § 26-18-7(a)(2) (2004) ("unable to care for
the needs of the child").
6. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5 (2004) ("Grounds for Termination of the
Parent-Child Relationship .... The petition may be granted where the court finds that.., because
of mental deficiency or mental illness, the parent is and will continue to be incapable of giving the
child proper parental care."); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 (2004) ("mental
impairment.. . or mentally retarded"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-61 (LexisNexis 2005) (mentally
retarded).
7. See, e.g., Maurice A. Feldman & Laurie Case, Teaching Child-Careand Safety Skills to
Parentswith Intellectual DisabilitiesThrough Self-Learning, 24 J. INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITY 27,

42 (1999).
8. See, e.g., In re Loraida G., 701 N.Y.S.2d 822, 825 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999).
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studies demonstrating that, where there are gaps in knowledge,
developmentally delayed parents have been successfully taught how to
remedy these deficiencies, the statutes and the judges applying them
should promote rehabilitation. Part V will describe the potentially
unconstitutional aspects of termination of parental rights statutes as to
intellectually disabled parents, both under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the United States Constitution. 9 This Part
concludes that neither offers adequate protection against a termination of
parental rights, underscoring the need for change in the statutes.

II.

DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTION OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY

A.

DescriptionofIntellectualDisability

There are an estimated seven to eight million people in the United
States who come under the broad category of "intellectually disabled."'
It is important to recognize that, although the following generalizations
suggest that this term has scientific support, there are also detractors who
argue against the use of such terms, warning that they are little more
than labels. 1 A number of scholars
have repeatedly challenged a narrow
12
intelligence.
of
interpretation
The characteristics that all people labeled "intellectually disabled"
share are: significant limitations in intelligence, which occurred during
the person's major developmental period (ending around age eighteen to
twenty-one), and deficits in adaptive skills. 13 Intelligence is usually
9. Although this Note does not examine the parental rights of intellectually disabled parents
in an international human rights context, it is informative to note that the European Court has
interpreted Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights as protecting the right of
mentally disabled parents to have a continuing relationship with their children. See Lawrence 0.
Gostin & Lance Gable, The Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Global
Perspective on the Application of Human Rights Principlesto Mental Health, 63 MD. L. REV. 20,
95 (2004).
10. See PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELL. DISABILITIES, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., FACT SHEET, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs
/pcpid/pcpid-fact.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
11. See, e.g., BURTON BLATT, IN AND OUT OF MENTAL RETARDATION 27 (1981) (stating that
mental retardation is an "administrative term" with "little, if any, scientific integrity").
12. Dr. Howard Gardner, a professor of education at Harvard, is a notable detractor. In his
book on the subject, he posits that that there are actually multiple intelligences and the definition of
"smart" should be expanded to include bodily-kinesthetic and interpersonal intelligences, among
others. See HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED: MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 34, 42-43 (1999).
13. See ANTHONY M. GRAZIANO, DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: INTRODUCTION TO A
DIVERSE FIELD 200-01 (2002).
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defined using an IQ test.14 With a mean score of 100, any score under
seventy is defined as low IQ. 15 "Adaptive skills" refers to what people
exhibit as they go about their daily lives, 16 taking care of themselves and
relating to their environment.' 7 The American Association on Mental
Retardation lists the following as specific examples of adaptive behavior
skills:
"receptive
and
expressive
language... money
concepts... gullibility
(likelihood
of
bring
tricked
or
manipulated).., using transportation and doing housekeeping
activities.' 8 People who share these traits are further subdivided into
Mildly, Moderately, and Severely Disabled. 19
Severe intellectual disability is marked by an IQ of thirty-five or
lower and is also characterized by high rates of organically based
retardation, which refers to genetic, chromosomal, and other biological
etiologies. 20 A high proportion of people in this group also have serious
birth defects and physical impairments.2 ' People with severe intellectual
disabilities will need lifelong support, likely in an institution, a
14.

There are a number of questions raised in reference to both the validity and use of IQ

tests. People who are in the lower ranges of the intelligence scale test inconsistently, sometimes
meeting the threshold for mild mental retardation and sometimes not. See Donald L. Macmillan et
al., A Challenge to the Viability of Mild Mental Retardation as a Diagnostic Category, 62
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 356, 360 (1996). The score may change depending upon who administered
the test, when, and under what conditions. This is troubling because an upward increase of only a
few points, for example, from a seventy to a seventy-three, can mean the difference between a label
of "intellectual disability" and no diagnosis. This has especial potential for harm in applying statutes
that require a "diagnosable" condition. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103 (2005). The IQ test
is also problematic because it has been used to support social injustices, both historically and
currently. During the early 1900s, proponents of the eugenics movement used IQ tests to support
and effect the isolation and sterilization of people labeled "moron" or "idiot." See MARTHA A.
FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION:
HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 43 (1999). IQ tests continue to be used to track minority children
into special education classes, which some scholars argue is a subversive mode of maintaining
segregated schools. See Beth A. Ferri & David J. Connor, Special Education and the Subverting of
Brown, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 57, 59-61 (2004).
15. See GRAZIANO, supra note 13, at 204 (citing HELEN BEE, THE DEVELOPING CHILD (6th ed
1992)).
16. Assessments of a person's abilities are made individually as he or she goes through her
routine in his or her specific surroundings. Thus, a person with an IQ below seventy may be able to
function in his small, rural community, but a person with the same IQ would not be able to cope
with the demands of urban living. See FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 14, at 29-30.
17. AM. Ass'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, FACT SHEET: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT
MENTAL
RETARDATION
(July
9,
2002),
at
http://www.aamr.org/Policies
/mentalretardation.shtml.
18. Id.
19. The descriptions of each category of mental retardation are taken from GRAZIANO, supra
note 13, at 209-13.
20. Id.at 212.
21. Id.
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residential facility, or at home, and account for about five to ten percent
of people with intellectual disabilities.22
People with moderate intellectual disabilities comprise about ten
percent of the population and have IQ levels of about thirty-five to fortynine. 23 It is common to find developmental delays across many
functions, but children can develop basic reading and math skills.24 With
lifelong support and training, people in this group may be able to live on
their own. For example, a person with moderate retardation may be able
to live in her own apartment while continuing to have regular meetings
with a caseworker.2 a
People with mild intellectual disabilities comprise the largest group
by far, accounting for seventy-five to eighty percent of people with
intellectual disabilities.26 This Note will primarily focus on this
population both because it is the largest 27 and because the often nebulous
delineations between this population and the general population bring
the discriminatory nature of state statutes into sharpest relief. An IQ of
fifty to seventy characterizes mild intellectual disability.2 8 Delays are
most apparent in people's cognitive abilities, meaning that often they are
not diagnosed until they enter school.2 9 Out of school, mildly
intellectually disabled people can become so integrated into society that
they cannot be distinguished from non-disabled people. 30 Although they
may benefit from continuing social support and may rely on family or
friends for some assistance, people in this group can live independently
and work in certain jobs.3 1
B.

Validity of Categories

Many researchers have argued that mild intellectual disability is
actually not a viable category because people in this group have a
different basis for their disability compared to people in the other two
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25.

See, e.g., RACHEL SIMON, RIDING THE BUS WITH MY SISTER 3, 16 (2002) (describing the

author's moderately developmentally delayed sister who lives on her own but receives government
assistance and has a case management team).
26. GRAZIANO, supra note 13, at 209.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at209-10.
30. See Macmillan et al., supra note 14, at 363 (noting that people may still exhibit certain
limitations).
31.

GRAZIANO, supranote 13, at 210.
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categories.3 2 In fact, researchers suggest that the three groups be changed
into two, based on whether the cause of intellectual disability is
"organic" or "familial., 33 Moderate and severe intellectual disabilities
are almost always linked to organic causes such as chromosomal
abnormalities, birth defects, or brain injury. 34 By contrast, mild mental
retardation is rarely caused by these factors. 35 "Familial" retardation is
defined contextually, and it is believed that this type of intellectual
disability is caused by a combination of genetics (parental intellectual
ability) and risk factors, such as poverty, developmental neglect, and
limited stimulation.36
For those with organically-based disabilities, impaired functioning
is always evident, while for the second group the disability may only be
apparent in some situations.3 7 This phenomenon has been defined as "6hour retardation,, 38 based on a study of intellectually disabled children.
This study found that children who had been labeled as such behave in a
way consistent with being cognitively delayed when they are in school,
but that out39 of school they may interact successfully and not read as
"retarded., Thus, while the intellectual disabilities of the first group are
more permanent, the second group can improve mental functioning. This
has led researchers to suggest new terms to define this group based on
the primary distinction. 40 It also demonstrates the fluid nature of
intellectual disabilities, which is contrary to its use as a static
characteristic in the termination of parental rights statutes.

32. Id.at213.
33.

See EDWARD ZIGLAR & ROBERT M. HODAPP, UNDERSTANDING MENTAL RETARDATION

51(1986).
34. Id.
35.

GRAZlANO,supra note 13, at 213.

36. See ZIGLAR & HODAPP, supra note 33, at 51, 58.
37. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPECIAL EDUCATION: A REFERENCE FOR THE EDUCATION OF THE
HANDICAPPED AND OTHER EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN AND ADULTS 1652 (Cecil R. Reynolds &
Elaine Fletcher-Janzen eds., 2000).
38. Id.
39. See id There have been more recent studies that have not had the same findings. Instead,
these researchers have found that the children continue to exhibit delays outside of the classroom
and into adulthood. See id.
at 1653.
40. The distinction between organic and non-organic mental retardation has been a factor in
court decisions in relation to the parent's potential for improvement. See, e.g., In re Keiondre S.
2004 WL 2690668 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (terminating parental rights of a mother where mental
retardation was thought to be the result of an organic brain injury and where experts testified that
the retardation was chronic and her parenting abilities were not likely to change).
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III.

INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED PARENTS

Research suggests that the number of intellectually disabled parents
is significant and clearly demonstrates that this population's numbers
have been on the rise since changing attitudes have allowed the
cognitively delayed to bear children.4 1 Once sterilized to prevent
procreation,4 2 mentally disabled people were historically viewed by the
public as a class whose reproduction should be controlled. This remains
true to a certain extent,43 but many intellectually disabled people are
making more decisions for themselves and are a more visible part of
society today than they traditionally were.
In the past, there have only been two options for a mentally
disabled individual, which were either to be institutionalized or to live
with one's family. 44 In 1930, state statutes that mandated permanent
institutionalization for the "feebleminded" sent 68,035 people to
institutions. 45 Advocacy for change in the marginalized status of people
with mental delays began in the 1970s, influenced by other civil rights
movements of the time. 46 These advocates won a significant victory with
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,47 a precursor to the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which prohibited discrimination by the federal

41. See Tim Booth & Wendy Booth, Parenting with Learning Difficulties: Lessons for
Practitioners,23 BRIT. J. Soc. WORK 459, 459 (1993); see also Linda Dowdney & David Skuse,
Parenting Provided by Adults with Mental Retardation, 34 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & CHILD
PSYCHIATRY 25, 25 (1993).
42. In the now infamous case of Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court approved the eugenic
sterilization of Carrie Buck, with Justice Holmes declaring that "three generations of imbeciles are
enough." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). This decision has never been overruled, although
legal scholars have denounced it as a clearly discriminatory decision. See, e.g., Jana Leslie-Miller,
From Bell to Bell: Responsible Reproduction in the Twentieth Century, 8 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 123, 123, 150 (1997).
43. There is a continuing debate among advocates for and the families of the mentally
disabled over sterilization and whether a person with mental disabilities should be able to choose it
or whether someone else may choose it for her. Courts have held both ways. Compare In re
Guardianship of Matjski, 419 N.W.2d 576, 576, 580 (Iowa 1988) (holding that the lower court had

the authority to hear and decide the parents' petition to have their thirty-three-year-old daughter
sterilized) with In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 483 (N.J. 1981) (setting up a statute-like standard for
determining whether someone other than the mentally retarded individual could decide the issue of
sterilization, stressing that a best interests determination be made).
44. See FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 14, at 9. An alternative to institutionalization was that
the family would pay another family to take the child in. See id
45. Id. at 11.
46. JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT Us: DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND
EMPOWERMENT 130 (1998).

47. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2005) (finding that "individuals with disabilities constitute one of the
most disadvantaged groups in society," and "disability is a natural part of the human experience and
in no way diminishes the right[s] of individuals").
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government and by federally funded programs.48 Based on findings that
disabled people continued to face discrimination, 49 Congress passed the
Americans with Disabilities Act,50 extending comprehensive civil rights
to disabled people, including those with mental disabilities.5' Since this
important act,52 disabled people have had increased access to resources,
including housing and jobs, which has enabled them to become more
integrated into society. 53 Advances in understanding the capabilities of
people with mental disabilities have aided in the general move away
from institutionalization and towards normalization. 54 Among its goals,
the President's Committee for People with Intellectual Disabilities has
listed "increasing employment and economic independence and
promoting access and integration into community life' 55 for people with
intellectual disabilities. With the move into mainstream society and more
control over reproduction have come increases in the number of
mentally delayed people who are finding partners and bearing children.56
Yet, these parents often find themselves the focus of state involvement.
Though there is not a clear correlation between low IQ and parental
unfitness, 57 parents with mental disabilities are more likely than the rest
of the parental population to have their children removed 58 and their
parental rights terminated. One study examined over two hundred
consecutive cases that came before the juvenile court in Boston and
found that despite greater compliance with court orders, parents with
intellectual disabilities had their children removed more often than non-

48. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2005).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2005).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Some reformers actually began training and educational programs in the late 1800s, but
these practices did not become widespread until much later. FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 14, at
10.
53. Id.at 333.
54. Id. at 12.
55. PRESIDENT'S COMM. FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELL. DISABILITIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., FACT SHEET, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/pcpid/pcpid_

fact.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
56. See David McConnell & Gwynnyth Llewellyn, Stereotypes, Parents with Intellectual
Disability and ChildProtection,24 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 297, 297 (2002).
57. See Steven A. Rosenburg & Gay Angel McTate, Intellectually Handicapped Mothers.
Problems and Prospects,CHILDREN TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 24, 24 ("I.Q. is not a good predictor
of parenting ability.").
58. Children are removed from their cognitively disabled parents at a rate of forty to sixty
percent. See McConnell & Llewellyn, supra note 56, at 297.
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diagnosed parents. 59 These initial removals often lead to a termination of
parental rights. A study following sixty-four children of low-functioning
parents facing allegations of abuse or neglect found that in over half of
those cases parental rights were terminated.6 °
Mentally delayed parents more often face allegations of neglect
than allegations of abuse or risk of abuse. 61 Although neglect can be as
damaging to children as physical abuse,62 the general category of neglect
covers a wider range of possible harms.63 Some of these highlight a need
for family services more than a need to remove the child from the
parents. For example, a common cause of action against delayed parents
is educational neglect, or failing to ensure that the child is attending
school. This may be indicative of more pervasive neglect, as it was in
the case of In re Kim C.,6 4 where the mother was also failing to take her
children to the doctor and had substance abuse problems, and the
children displayed serious emotional problems.6 5 Or, the parent may
simply need some help in getting her child to school. One mother whose
older children had been removed due to general neglect did not want to
send her five-year-old to kindergarten. The child said he did not want to
go and cried when she took him into the building, so she would take him
back home. 66 Her social worker modeled taking the child to school and
telling him that they would be back. The child adjusted, the mother
realized that he was okay, and he subsequently had a much better
attendance record.67
59. Carol G. Taylor et al., DiagnosedIntellectual and Emotional Impairment Among Parents
who Seriously Mistreat Their Children: Prevalence, Type, and Outcome in a Court Sample, 15
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 389, 398 (1991).

60. Elizabeth A.W. Seagull & Susan L. Scheurer, Neglected andAbused Children of Mentally
Retarded Parents, 10 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 493, 496 (1986) (stating that when the report was
followed up on, only seventeen percent of the original sixty-four children remained in their parents'
care).
61. See McConnell & Llewellyn, supra note 56, at 301. Additionally, allegations of abuse or
neglect are often against someone other than the mentally delayed parent. See Daphne E. Glaun &
Patricia F. Brown, Motherhood, Intellectual Disability and Child Protection: Characteristicsof a
Court Sample, 24 J. INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITY 95, 98 (1999). However, this is still a cause of

action against the parent, called a failure to protect. Id.
62. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER
DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 67 (1999).

63. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290 (2005) ("'[N]eglect' means the failure by a person
responsible for the child's welfare to provide necessary food, care, clothing, shelter, or medical
attention for a child.").
64. 1997 WL 586454 (Ohio 1997).
65. Id. at *34.
66. Telephone interview with Naomi Abraham, Esq., L.M.S.W., in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Jan. 18,
2006).
67. Id.
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Mentally delayed parents are more likely to face a host of issues
that make it difficult for people without mental delays to be effective
parents. 68 As a group, cognitively delayed parents tend to have low selfesteem, be isolated from their extended families, 69 and struggle with the
effects of poverty, including living in substandard housing.70 Poverty
often adversely affects parenting, and certain housing conditions, such as
crowding, are more likely to increase familial tension and decrease
parental supervision of children. 71 Mentally delayed parents are often illequipped to deal with these and other stressors. For example, the quality
of parenting by mothers with low IQ may worsen when the mothers have
additional children. 72 There is also a high incidence of co-morbidity, the
presence of more than one disorder, for mentally delayed parents.73 One
study found that eight of the twelve mothers who participated had one or
more conditions, including substance abuse, medical conditions, and
psychiatric disorders, in addition to mental delays.74
With these various adverse conditions, it would not be surprising to
find that mentally delayed parents are not meeting their children's needs.
Indeed, some parents are not.75 Yet, although there are definitional
difficulties in assessing parenting,7 6 it has been repeatedly shown that
intellectually disabled individuals have basic parenting skills 77 or can
acquire them.78
In his article on intellectually disabled parents and the law, Robert
Hayman posited that, while there is neither an accepted legal definition
nor a clearly articulated social science definition of "good parent," there

68. See Rosenburg & McTate, supra note 57, at 24.
69. See Glaun & Brown, supra note 61, at 103.
70. See Barbara Y. Whitman et al., Training in Parenting Skills for Adults with Mental
Retardation, 34 SOC. WORK 431, 431 (1989).
71. See Robert H. Bradley, Environment and Parenting,in 2 HANDBOOK OF PARENTING 235,
250 (Marc H. Bornstein ed., 1995).
72. See Leanne Whiteside-Mansell et al., Patterns of ParentingBehavior in Young Mothers,
45 FAM. REL. 273, 280 (1996).
73. See McConnell & Llewellyn, supra note 56, at 301.
74. See Glaun & Brown, supra note 61, at 103.
75. See, e.g., In re Michael B., 594 N.W.2d 674, 677-78 (Neb. Ct. App. 1999) (dealing with a
mentally delayed mother who used excessive discipline with children, used drugs and alcohol in
their presence, and allowed daughter to use alcohol).
76. Instead of attempting to define the characteristics of an adequate parent, the laws tend to
focus on what constitutes an unfit parent. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301 (2005) (finding a
parent unfit where "a consistent pattern of specific conduct before the children or of specific
conditions directly relating to the parent and child relationship ... renders the parent unable, for the
reasonably foreseeable future, to care appropriately for.., the child").
77. See, e.g., In re Loraida G., 701 N.Y.S.2d 822 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999).
78. See, e.g., Feldman & Case, supra note 7, at 28.
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are four standards that have been repeatedly set out and relied upon.79
The premises of these standards are that the parents must be able to do
the following: protect and maintain the health and safety of the child,
meet the child's physical needs, meet the child's emotional needs, and
stimulate the child's intellectual growth.8 ° In surveying the literature on
characteristics of mentally delayed parents and on their parenting skills
in general, Hayman found that the bulk of research supports the ability
of cognitively disabled parents to protect their children, meet their
emotional and physical needs, and provide a healthy home
environment. 81 There is nothing inherent in a diagnosis of mental
disability that precludes a parent from loving her child or maintaining
her child's safety.
However, there continue to be concerns that, even if intellectually
disabled parents are not more likely to physically harm or neglect their
children, there is a higher probability that they will not provide sufficient
stimulation and will cause developmental delays in their children.82 In
their interviews with child protection workers, researchers found that the
workers presumed that children remaining in the home with their
cognitively delayed parent would inevitably become developmentally
delayed.83 Caseworkers assumed that the parent would not be able to
adapt to their children's changes and would not provide the stimulation
necessary for normal development. 84 Seeming to substantiate what the
case workers and others have assumed, studies have demonstrated that
that there is a higher incidence of developmental delays in children born
to parents with low IQs. 85 Due to concerns that other factors were
affecting the data, one study controlled for poverty and still found a
higher incidence of delays among children raised by mentally delayed
parents.86
Attempting to further isolate the causes of these developmental
difficulties, another groups of researchers examined thirty-seven
79. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptionsof Justice: Law, Politics,and the Mentally Retarded
Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1216-17 (1990).
80. Id. at 1217.
81. See id. at 1219-22 (discussing application of studies on intellectually disabled parents to
each of the four parenting categories outlined).
82. DAVID MCCONNELL ET AL., UNIV. OF SYDNEY, PARENTS WITH A DISABILITY AND THE
NSW CHILDREN'S COURT 34 (2000).

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Maurice A. Feldman & Nicole Walton-Allen, Effects of Maternal Mental
Retardation and Poverty on Intellectual,Academic and Behavioral Status of School-Age Children,
101 AMER. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 352, 360 (1997).
86. See Keltner et al., supra note 3, at 54.
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children born to intellectually disabled mothers.87 The study confirmed
earlier findings, with a substantial number of the children showing
delays. The most prevalent delays were in motor and communication
development.88 Yet, interestingly, the researchers did not find any
statistically significant correlation between the mother's IQ level and the
child's developmental level. 89 Also, on average, the quality of the home
environment did not vary from norms, and no significant correlation was
90
found between the home environment and the children's development.
The study offered other potential reasons for the children's delays, such
as organic causes, 9 1 and concluded that presuming a lack of stimulation
based merely upon the parent's mental delays is prejudicial against these
parents. 92 Thus, this demonstrates the lack of a rational basis for statutes
correlating parental mental deficiencies with ill effects on the child,
despite higher incidences of mental delays among these children.
Mentally delayed parents are more likely to have mentally disabled
children. In offspring of two retarded parents, the incidence of child
retardation is forty percent. For one retarded parent, the incidence is
twenty percent.93 However, it is unclear how much of this correlation is
due to genetics and how much is environmentally based. 94 As discussed
above, researchers believe that environmental factors are especially
likely to come into play where the individual has been diagnosed mildly
intellectually disabled. 95 If this is the case, it speaks to the inherent
problems in labeling people "retarded" who may simply need more
educational assistance; it also supports creating better social support for
all children growing up in environments that are not intellectually
stimulating.96 If the causes are genetic, it is as if these parents are
predestined to lose any children that they have. Society may feel that this

87.

David McConnell et al., Developmental Profiles of Children Born to Mothers with

Intellectual Disability,28 J. INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITY 122, 125 (2003).
88. Id. at 131.
89.
90.

Id.
id. at 132.

91.

Id. at 127 (finding evidence of possible organic pathology in forty-six percent of the

children studied).
92. Id. at 132.
93. See FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 14.

94. Id. at 76; see also McConnell and Llewellyn study discussed supra note 87, at 132
(suggesting that organic causes offer a better empirical explanation than environmental ones).
95. See Edward Zigler & David Balla, Motivational and Personality Factors in the
Performance of the Retarded, in MENTAL RETARDATION: THE DEVELOPMENTAL-DIFFERENCE

CONTROVERSY 9 (Edward Zigler & David Balla eds., 1982).
96. See BARTHOLET, supra note 62, at 102 (discussing the importance of intellectual and
environmental stimulation to children's development).
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population's reproduction should be controlled-making a move back to
the days of forced sterilization a more humane means to the same end.97
IV.

INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED PARENTS AND TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS STATUTES

Statutes govern every aspect of a child welfare proceeding,
including: who may determine when an investigation must be made into
allegations of child abuse or neglect,9 8 what types of services the family
may receive to promote reunification,9 9 and when the parent-child
relationship may be severed by a termination of parental rights.100 It is
this last type of action, which Justice Ginsburg stated is "among the
most severe forms of state action,"' 0 1 that is the focus of this Note.
The termination of parental rights of the intellectually disabled is an
area where the tension between the state's interests in a child and a
parent's interests in a child is pronounced,10 2 involving "the degree of
risk to children that society is willing to take, relative to its interpretation
of the rights of the parents."' 3 Primarily promulgated by the states, the
individual statutes take diverse approaches to balancing these two
competing interests, though they tend to favor the state interest in
protecting children. Federal law has also affected state legislation
regarding termination of parental rights, most notably with the Adoption
and Safe Families Act ("ASFA").
A.

Adoption and Safe FamiliesAct

In 1997, Congress passed ASFA, enacting a number of changes 1to
04
the federal government's approach regarding child welfare. 1°5
Lawmakers were concerned by the high rates of children in foster care
and by reports of these children remaining in foster care limbo for three
or more years while the state attempted to reunite them with their natural
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
Statutory
(2004).
103.

See supranotes 41-42 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.301 (2005).
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-423 (2005).
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-94 (2005).
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996).
See Catherine Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, "Bad" Mothers, and
Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 176, 177
THOMAS GRIsso, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES 206 (1986).

104. 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2005).
105. In 1995 there were an estimated 486,000 children in foster care, a seventy percent
increase since 1986. See MICHAEL R. PETIT & PATRICK A. CURTIS, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A
LOOK AT THE STATES 72 (1997).
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parents.10 6 Extended stays in foster care created less adoptable children,
both because they tended to be older'0 7 and because they began to
demonstrate the ill-effects of what scholars called "foster drift,' 1 8 or a
lack of permanency.
The changes created by ASFA were based on a shift in focus from
preservation of the family to permanency for children. 10 9 The federal
government mandated that states move children through foster care more
quickly, either towards adoption or family reunification. 10 Under this
new rubric, terminating parental rights has become easier and more
common."' The state may begin termination of parental rights
proceedings after the child has been in foster care for fifteen of the last
twenty-two months. The state receives financial incentives for successful
adoptions. Under certain circumstances, the state is not mandated to
provide reunification services to the family, and parental rights may be
12
terminated even if there is not an adoptive resource for the child."
Where the state agency is providing reunification services, with a goal of
returning the child to the parent, ASFA mandates that the agency engage
in "concurrent planning" towards adoption." 3
Despite the laudable goals of ASFA, it can create special problems
for mentally delayed parents and their children, especially when they are
not provided with appropriate reunification services. For example, parent
education programs that specialize in teaching cognitively delayed
parents are still rare.' 14 Thus, a mentally delayed parent who needed to
learn basic parenting skills would likely be assigned with higher
functioning parents to a class which focused on more rehabilitative

106. Cheryl Wetzstein, Fewer Foster Care Youths Await Adoption, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2004, at A3.
107. See James A. Rosenthal, Outcomes ofAdoption of Children with SpecialNeeds, 3 FUTURE
CHILD.: ADOPTION 79 (1993).

108. See Libby S. Adler, The Meaning of Permanence: A CriticalAnalysis of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (2001); see also BARTHOLET, supra note 62,
at 179.
109. Susan L. Brooks & Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice and Family Court Reform, 40 FAM.
CT. REV. 453, 454 (2002).
110. Id.
111. However, an important limitation on the ease of adjudicating a termination of parental
rights was created with the holding in Santosky v. Kramer 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982), that, before a
state can sever the parent-child relationship, the allegations of abuse or neglect must be supported
by clear and convincing evidence, at the least.
112. See Richard P. Barth et al., From Anticipation to Evidence; Research on the Adoption and
Safe FamiliesAct, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 371, 371 (2005).
113. Brooks & Roberts, supra note 109, at 454.
114. See Feldman & Case, supra note 7, at 28.
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needs.' 15 Although the parent would likely not benefit from this nor be
able to utilize the skills taught, the state agency would not have an
obligation to provide further services. As long as the agency places the
children in a pre-adoptive home, the default plan of adoption continues6
to be pursued and the agency would satisfy all federal requirements."
Yet, it is not only federal requirements that must be met. The power of
ASFA can be either increased or diminished by the individual state
statutes which govern child welfare proceedings.
B. State Termination of ParentalRights Statutes
A mentally delayed parent's experience with the child protective
system will, in large part, be determined by where that parent lives. State
statutes vary widely, both in terms of the grounds included for a
termination and in the specificity with which those grounds are defined.
Because mental delays have no direct correlation to parental unfitness,
the best statutes are those that do not deem intellectually disabled
parents categorically unfit, and the most problematic statutes are those
that tie these two unrelated characteristics together.
1. The Best State Termination of Parental Rights Statutes
A number of states do not have any direct reference to mentally
delayed parents in their termination statutes. Instead, these states give
the court the discretion to decide whether the parent is able to take care
of the child based on the facts presented.
Vermont's statute is representative of this group, because it lists
grounds for a termination of parental rights 1 7 while still allowing a
judge a fair amount of discretion. It states that the court should "consider
all relevant factors," and the court "may include"" 8 such factors as
2
19
being in regular communication,1 0
providing financial support,

115. The court in In re Loraida G noted that the mother's case was unusual because "parents
generally know, or should know, the skills necessary to adequately meet their child's needs and fail
to employ them ... [while] this respondent actively seeks to learn and utilize the requisite skills."
701 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999). Individuals have asserted that the failure to
appropriately modify services is a violation of the ADA, but these cases have mostly been
unsuccessful. See Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to
Terminationof the ParentalRights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities,16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 387, 415-20 (2000).
116. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 45 (2002)

(arguing
117.
118.
119.

that inadequate family reunification services will act as a fast track towards adoption).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504 (2004).
Id. § 3-504(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Id. § 3-504(a)(2)(A).
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meeting the child's physical and emotional needs, 121 and providing a
safe environment. 122 The issue of a parent's mental delays would most
likely be raised in reference to the parent's ability to meet the children's
needs but would not need to be discussed if those factors were not at
issue. It is noteworthy that this statute also suggests that a judge consider
the parent's ability to "provide the child with love."'1 23 Including this
factor would likely help tip the balance in favor of a loving mentally
delayed parent
who is not providing, for example, the safest
24
environment. 1

Other states simply list the characteristics of an unfit parent, as
26
1 25
opposed to tying those traits to a source. For example, Minnesota
allows for a termination of parental rights if the court finds that a parent
is unfit:
[B]ecause of a consistent pattern of specific conduct before the
children or of specific conditions directly relating to the parent and
child relationship either of which are determined by the court to be of a
duration or nature that renders the parent unable, for the
127 reasonably
foreseeable future, to care appropriately for... the child.
It is interesting that this language is similar to that used by other
state statutes, except these other state statutes substitute
"mental
12 8
deficiency" for "consistent pattern" or "specific conditions."
These statutes follow the logic that, when a parent with intellectual
disabilities is incapable of parenting, it is highly likely that there are
problems in the parent-child relationship that are sufficiently covered by
other statutory categories of unfitness. Even states that allow for a
termination based on cognitive delays may not need to use this provision
when there are other reasons for terminating. For example, in B.S. v.

120. Id. § 3-504(a)(2)(B).
121. Id. § 3-504(b)(2)(B).
122. Id. § 3-504(b)(2)(C).
123. Id § 3-504(b)(2)(A).
124. Factoring in the parents' love for their child could have brought about a different outcome
in In re Adoption of Lenore where the court affirmed the finding that the mother and father's
cognitive delays and dirty home were reason enough to terminate parental rights despite finding that
respondents "care deeply for their daughter." 770 N.E.2d 498, 498, 504 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
125. For other states using a similar system of categorization, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a407 (2004). See also N.M. STAT ANN. § 32A-5-15 (2005).
126. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301 (2005).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-18-7 (LexisNexis 2004) ("[M]ental deficiency of the
parent... of such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to care for the needs of the
child.").
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Cullman County Department of Human Resources,2 9 Judge Murdock
wrote in the concurrence that, while the majority focused upon the
mother's intellectual disability as a reason for termination, the mother
had also abandoned her children by failing to visit them. 130 This alone
would have warranted a termination of parental rights according to
Alabama Code section 26-18-7(a)(1). 13 1 In another case, In re B.L.,' 13 2 the
mentally delayed mother initially had her children removed for general
neglect. 13 3 The mother then moved to another state to be with her
boyfriend, 134 leaving her children in the care of the state and visiting
them only three times over a six-month period. 135 Although the state
statute includes mental disability as a ground for termination, 136 the
Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld the termination of her parental rights
based on abandonment. 137 Since the state statute only requires that one
statutory ground for termination be established by clear and convincing
evidence, 13 8 there was no need to adjudicate the issue of the mother's
mental delays.
A third example of this is a Delaware case, Division of Family
Services v. B. W. 13 9 Delaware state law 140 allows for a termination based
on a parent's mental incompetence and concomitant inability to provide
care for the child. 14 1 It also allows for a termination if the parent has
failed to plan for the child. 42 In making this determination, the court
considers such relevant factors as the respondent's efforts and abilities,
the effect of a change in custody, and the effect on the child of a delay in
termination. 143 The case involved a young mother who was herself in
foster care when her child was born. The child was placed with a
relative, then in the custody of the state. 144 In the course of the
permanency hearing, a psychological evaluation revealed that the

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

865 So. 2d 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).
Id.at1198.
Id.
No. M2003-01877-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 2451355, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1,2004).
Id. at *7.

134. Id. at *8.
135. Id.at *4.
136. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113 (2005).
137. In reB.L., 2004 WL 2451355, at *10.
138.

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113 (2005).

139.
140.
141.
142.

No. 03-05-02TN, 2004 DEL. FAM. CT. LEXIS 46, at *1 (Del. Fain Ct. 2004).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103 (2004).
Id.
See id.

143.
144.

See id.
B. W., 2004 DEL. FAM. CT. LEXIS, at *6.
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mother's cognitive functioning was below average, 45 yet this was not
the basis upon which her rights were terminated. Instead, the judge
found that the mother failed to make and follow a plan for reunification
with her child, and terminated on that basis.' 46 The mother's mental
delays were only one of a number of factors 147 that would evidence
continued instability if the child were returned to the mother.
2. Problematic State Statutes
The state statutes categorically defining mental disabilities as a
basis for a termination of parental rights should be revised because there
is insufficient reason for basing one on the other. Though there has been
some improvement in state statutes as far as terminating the rights of
intellectually disabled parents, they are past due for further changes.
Historically, these statutes allowed for the removal of the child and
a termination of rights upon a showing of retardation, without a
48
requirement of any adverse effects to the child or inability to parent.
Today, this would be recognized as blatantly discriminatory. Thus, those
state statutes that continue to include mental deficiency in their
termination of parental rights statutes require a connection between the
disability and the parental failings.
Yet, even with these advances, certain statutes in this group
negatively stand out because of their potential to be misapplied and
misused, perhaps unwittingly, to break up functioning families. Their
common problems are: ambiguities in language concerning both the
needs of a child and the nature of a parent's disability, and allowing for
judgments made on speculation as opposed to fact.
a.

Ambiguities

Although statutes may be found unconstitutionally vague, 14 9 a
vaguely worded statute is less likely to violate the Constitution than to
lead to confusion in its application. The statutes that list mental disability
as grounds for termination of parental rights typically tie the disability to
an inability to care for the child, without defining exactly what this
entails.
145.

Id. at *I 1- 12.

146. See id. at *42.
147. See id. at *35-36, *42-43. The court also considered the mother's homelessness, the
termination of her parental rights as to her first child, and her incarceration.
148. See FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 14, at 243.
149. A statute must be written so that a person of average intelligence would understand its
scope, otherwise, it is unconstitutionally vague. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).
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Alabama's statute is a prime example of this because it requires that
the disability "render the parent unable to care for needs of the child." 50
Though this narrows the class of mentally delayed parents who meet the
criteria, the limitation is vague in its use of the words "needs" and
"care." Children's needs vary widely, from love, to homework help, to
food. A mentally delayed parent may be able to fulfill some of these
needs and may need assistance in providing others. 151 It is not hyperbole
to suggest that, without a clear delineation of which needs are at stake, a
social worker may validly testify that the parent is not meeting the
child's needs because she cannot help with homework.
The Oregon statute is even more vague, stating only that the mental
deficiency must "render the parent incapable of providing proper care
for the child."'1 2 Mississippi's statute presents more guidance, stating
that the mental deficiency must render the parent unable to take
"minimally, acceptable care of the child. 1 53 Even with this further
elucidation, a decision on what
constitutes "proper care" or "need" is
15 4
bound to be a value judgment.
Improper judgments may result from an ambiguous definition of
the level of the parent's mental delay. The parent's delays may not be
severe and may not even be at the root of the abuse or neglect
allegations. If the legislature feels compelled to retain mental disability
as a ground, it should ensure that the disability is sufficiently defined.
For example, New Hampshire's statute 55 requires that the mental
deficiency be "established by the testimony of either 2 licensed
1 56
psychiatrists or clinical psychologists or one of each acting together.
Compare this with Montana's statute, 157 where the court may primarily
consider the emotional illness or mental deficiency of the parent in a
termination of parental rights proceeding, but neither in this section nor
any other section of the code is either term defined.
150. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-18-7(a)(2) (2004).
151. See McConnell & Llewellyn, supra note 56, at 297.
152. OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.504 (2005).
153. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103 (2005).
154. Social definitions of what constitutes good care work against intellectually disabled
parents because they are often socially constructed to conform to middle class standards. See TIM
BOOTH & WENDY BOOTH, PARENTING UNDER PRESSURE: MOTHERS AND FATHERS WITH
LEARNING DIFFICULTIES 12 (1994).

155. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5 (2004).
156. Id. Georgia and Kentucky have similar, albeit less specific, statutory requirements that the
mental deficiency or retardation be "medically verifiable," GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-94 (2005), or
"attested to by a qualified mental health professional," KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.023 (West
2004).
157. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609 (2004).
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Other statutes narrow the term by defining the mental delay in
terms of its severity: "severe mental deficiency,"' 158 "mental deficiency
of the parent that is so severe and chronic,"' 159 or requiring that the parent
has been a patient at either a hospital or licensed treatment facility
because of a developmental disability for at least two of the past five
years.' 60 Though still problematic because they include mental delays,
these statutes effectively narrow the class, making them less likely to be
over-inclusive in their scope.
b.

Termination Based upon Future Rather than Past Actions

An inherent problem in this group of statutes is that the termination
is not simply based on the parent's past actions but on predictions about
their future ones as well. The statutes typically require that the mental
deficiency "render the parent unlikely within a reasonable time to care
for the ... child,"' 6' or that the mentally disabled parent be "unable to
discharge parental responsibilities. . . for a prolonged indeterminate
time. ' ' 162 Another allows for termination if "[t]here is a reasonable
likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that
the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the
parent.' 63 The problems with this scheme are twofold: (1) it leads to
decisions based on conjecture rather than wholly on facts; and (2) it does
not allow for the possibility that a parent will improve his or her skills
despite the continuing mental disability.
This method is counter-intuitive because it encourages judges to
speculate as to how the parent might act in the future. The decision in In
re Children of L.S. and JA.,' 64 determining the parental fitness of a
mildly intellectually disabled mother, quotes language from an earlier
case165 stating that, when considering termination of parental rights, the
court relies "to a great extent upon the projected permanency of the
parent's inability to care for his or her child."'' 66 The court then goes on
to find that, although the county had not made a visit to the mother's
home in the four months prior to trial, 67 county workers visiting the year
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103 (2005).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.180 (West 2004).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415 (West 2004).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (2005).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292 (LexisNexis 2005).
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 712A.19b (LexisNexis 2005).
No. A04-453, 2004 WL 2521378, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 20,2005).
In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 1995).
Id. at 649.
In re Children ofL.S., 2004 WL 2521378, at *5.
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before found that the house was "cluttered" and filthy. 168 The court
found that this evidence was enough to conclude that the mother's house
would become
unsanitary again in the future, even if it was not at the
69
time of trial. 1
In another case involving a mildly intellectually disabled mother,
Jessica L. v. Orange County Social Services Agency,'70 the child was
taken from her mother when she was four days old because of the
mother's mental delays 171 and a lack of parenting skills. 172 A social
worker subsequently reported that the mother's limitations were less
severe than reported and that her interactions with her child improved
through supervision and classes, 173 although the mother did not know
what to do in certain safety situations. 74 Based upon this information,
the court upheld the lower court's ruling that the mother did not have the
mental capacity to develop basic parenting skills in the future and that
returning the child to the mother "would create a substantial risk of
detriment to the physical or emotional wellbeing of the [child].' 75 The
termination of her parental rights was deemed appropriate. 76 While the
mother in this case may have lacked the ability to develop parenting
skills, studies have demonstrated that other delayed parents have that
ability. This potential to improve makes future-based predictions
especially unjust.
Although parenting classes will not work for every delayed
parent, 77 a number of studies have documented programs that have
78
successfully taught parenting skills to cognitively delayed parents.'
These studies have determined that parental fitness is not dependent on

168. Id. at *1.
169. Id.at *5.
170. No. G031771, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4371 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2003).
171. Id.at*2.
172. Id.at*2 (discussing how the mother tried to feed her child too much milk and did not
change the child's diaper correctly).
173. Id.at*5.
174. Id.at *7.The mother did not know how to give a correct dose of medicine to her child and
said that if the child was throwing up she would call 911, but if the child was choking she would go
to the doctor. Id. In his study on learned skills, Maurice Feldman found that intellectually disabled
parents can be taught medical skills. See Feldman & Case, supra note 7.
175. Jessica L., 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4371, at *8. Notice that this language is very
similar to the requirements discussed in other state statutes governing termination of parental rights.
176. Id.at*14.
177. See, e.g., A.M. v. Lamar County Dep't of Human Res., 848 So. 2d 258, 260-61 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2002). A mentally delayed mother was given classes in basic house keeping and child care
after son's birth. Despite this training, on a later visit a caseworker found dirty diapers and clothes
on the floor, live roaches, and observed the parent feeding the baby with a dirty bottle. Id.
178. See, e.g., Whitman et al., supra note 70, at 433.
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IQ but instead on the relationship between the parent and child. 179 In one
study of parents with mild intellectual disability, the researchers focused
on teaching child care, safety, and health and found that the parents were
not only able to learn the skills, but also to maintain them over eighty
percent of the follow-up period. 180 This study purposely focused on selflearning, a relatively inexpensive method demonstrating that teaching is
a viable option for state agencies.181 Another study developed training in
an area where mentally delayed parents often demonstrate insufficiency:
child interaction. 182 After training, the mothers were more likely to make
imitative sounds with their children, sit and play with them, and praise
motor development.' 83 Ideally, such parenting services would be
provided before the parents come into contact with the child welfare
system. But even if they are not, skilled training that is tailored to the
needs of mentally delayed parents must be recognized as, "more
' 84
humane, more effective and cheaper than taking children into care."'
Two recent New York cases illustrate the potential for intellectually
disabled parents to learn how to care for their children. In In re Loraida
G., 185 the court was asked to terminate parental rights based solely on the
mother's intellectual disability, without any allegations of abuse or
neglect. 186 The Department of Social Services had removed the child
days after birth. 87 Previously, the mother had been adjudicated unfit to
care for her first-born child due to her mental disabilities, and the
Department sought to revoke parental rights for this child on the same
grounds. 188 However, the mother remained in close contact with the
child, participated in parenting classes, and was able to apply what she
had learned and to care appropriately for her child. 189 The court noted
that the parenting classes and support of agency personnel were essential

179. See id.
180. See Feldman & Case, supra note 7, at 42.
181. See id.
182. Maurice A. Feldman et al., Parent Education Project 1."Increasing Stimulating
Interactions of Developmentally Handicapped Mothers, 19 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 23, 33
(1986).
183. Id. This study confirmed the results of another 1986 study that found parental training
successfully increased the quality and frequency of interactions between mothers and children. See
Mary A. Slater, Modification of Mother-ChildInteraction Processes in Families with Children AtRiskfor Mental Retardation, 91 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 257, 264 (1986).
184. See MUKTI JAIN CAMPION, WHO'S FIT TO BE A PARENT? 163 (1995).

185. 701 N.Y.S.2d 822 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999).
186. Id.at 823.
187. Id.at 824.
188.

Id.

189. Id. at 825.
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to her growth, finding that, "with the supportive services in place and
respondent's openness to the instruction, the Court [did] not deem her
different than any new parent who must learn and adapt along with the
stages of their developing child."' 190
In another case, In re W W. Children,'91 the court found that a
mother with a low IQ 192 had demonstrated the potential for learning to
be a responsible parent.' 93 The court found this despite two
psychologists opining that the mother would not be able to care for her
children in the "foreseeable future" due to her mental retardation,
warranting state custody over the children under the New York
statute.1 94 The judge dismissed the petition for a termination of parental
rights based on his factual findings and granted the mother custody of
her children.' 95
Yet, the facts of this case also demonstrate the potential for
misapplying statutes that allow for categorical findings of unfitness
when the parent is intellectually disabled. The mother had previously
had her parental rights terminated as to her other children upon no more
than a showing of intellectual disability,' 96 despite the statutory
requirement that there be a demonstrated unfitness to parent. 97 As
discussed above, another common statutory safeguard against wrongful
termination is that more than one expert must testify as to the parent's
unfitness by reason of intellectual disability.' 98 Yet here, there were
three psychologists who were evidently wrong in deeming this mother
unfit. Because there is the potential for such interpretations, these
statutes must be changed.

190. Id.at 826.
191. 736 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001).
192. Note that three psychologists ranked the mother in this case at three different IQ levels,
ranging from fifty to sixty-three. This fact points to both the non-static nature of IQ and to
fundamental problems with the IQ test. See supra note 14.
193. In re W.W. Children, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
194. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(4)(c) (Consol. 2005).
195. In re W.W Children, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
196. Id.at 569.
197. N.Y. SOC. SERV.LAW § 384-b(4)(c) (2005) ("[P]arent or parents... are presently and for
the foreseeable future unable, by reason of mental illness or mental retardation to provide proper
and adequate care for a child.").
198. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT § 170-C:5 (2004) ("Mental deficiency or mental illness shall be
established by the testimony of either 2 licensed psychiatrists or clinical psychologists or one of
each acting together.").
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3. Comparing the Statutes' Effect on Children
The states that include mental deficiency as a ground for
termination of parental rights are not doing a better job of protecting
children than those that do not include such an allowance. Although
difficult to quantify, one measure of this is the number of child fatalities
due to child maltreatment in states where the statutes specifically factor
in mental delays compared with those that do not. The assumption would
be that, if leaving children in the care of their delayed parents (absent
other showings of abuse or neglect) is harmful, then there would be a
higher rate of child fatalities in those states. This is not the case.
The states discussed above which do not include mental delays in
their statutes are Vermont, Utah, Minnesota and New Mexico. 9 9 Their
respective rates of child fatalities in 2002 were 0, 1.68, 1.28, and 0.60
per 100,000 children.2 00 As for some of the states that do specify mental
deficiency in defining parental unfitness, Alabama, Oregon, Colorado,
Nebraska, Washington, New Hampshire, and Montana have respective
rates of child fatalities of 2.62, 2.46, 2.17, 2.96, 0.99, 0, and 1.85 per
100,000 children. 20 1 Almost across the board, the numbers of child
fatalities from maltreatment were lower in state statutes that do not
include mental disabilities. This could be explained by a number of
conjectures. One possibility is that not adjudicating cases where the
primary issue is a parent's mental disabilities frees time to pursue
parents who are actually harming their children.
C. Effect of TerminatingParentalRights
Though it is tempting to err on the side of removing children from
potentially harmful parents, it must be understood that terminating
parental rights does not alone solve all of a child's problems. The issues
must be framed practically by examining the reality of what happens to
children once parental rights are terminated. Children may be harmed by
the termination process itself, within the foster care system, or by the
disruption of an adoption.
A termination of parental rights is a profound experience for most
children and may be especially so for children of mentally delayed

199. Seesupra Part.B.1-2.
200. ADMIN. CHILD. & FAM., DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002:
REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEMS:
NATIONAL STATISTICS ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2002).

201.

Id.
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parents who feel an increased sense of responsibility to their parents. 202
One study found that the children of parents whose rights were
terminated experienced a deep sense of loss. 20 3 Often the bond between
the parent and child is especially strong.2 °4 There is also the potential for
a negative impact on the child's self-esteem and identity. Where parental
rights are involuntarily terminated due to some "defect" in the parent,
the child must either disconnect from the parent and lose part of his
identity or maintain identification with the family and the concomitant
identification with the defect, resulting in injury to his self-esteem.2 °5
Also, leading to less permanency rather than more, parental rights
may be terminated without having an adoptive family ready to take the
child.20 6 Children in this situation have been termed "legal orphans"
because they have no connection to a family, neither adoptive nor
biological.20 7 Because of this, a child may continue to live with various
foster parents even though legally free and available for a permanent
placement. 20 8 This is of special concern where the children themselves
have special needs, making them less adoptable.
Special-needs children have lower rates of adoption and, once
adopted, have higher rates of disruption, which is the termination of an
adoption proceeding before it is legally finalized 20 9 "Special needs" is
most commonly used to refer to children with mental or physical
disabilities, 2 10 including children with intellectual disabilities. 2 11 This is
noteworthy because, as discussed further below, parents with intellectual
202. See TIM BOOTH & WENDY BOOTH, GROWING UP WITH PARENTS WHO HAVE LEARNING
DIFFICULTIES 82 (1998).

203. See Chris Watkins, Beyond Status: The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and the Parental
Rights of People Labeled Developmentally Disabled or Mentally Retarded, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1415,
1458 (1995).
204. Id.
205. See Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of ParentalRights
Termination Proceedings,22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397, 414-15 (1996).
206. Some experts argue that, because there is the potential for this outcome, the law should be
changed and parental rights only terminated where there is a prospective adoptive family available.
See ROBERTS, supra note 116, at 61.
207. See id. at 45.
208. Although this may not seem facially different from a child who remains in foster care with
a continuing connection to a parent, studies have found otherwise. Research demonstrates that
children who maintain ties to their families while in foster care do better as adults. See id at 61.
209. See Rosenthal, supra note 107, at 78.
210. Some researchers have expanded the definition of "special needs." For example, James
Rosenthal defines the term broadly to include an older age at adoption, disabilities, and minority
ethnicity, which are all factors that may prevent adoption or lead to a disrupted adoption. See id. at
77.
211. LAURA BEAUVAIS-GODWIN & RAYMOND GODWIN, THE COMPLETE ADOPTION BOOK:
EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW TO ADOPT A CHILD 256 (2005).
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disabilities are more likely to have children with intellectual
disabilities. 1 2 Thus, high rates of termination within the delayed parent
population will lead to more special-needs children entering the adoption
pool, where they have a strong likelihood of remaining parentless.
However, ASFA may provide some safeguard against termination
in these cases. This is due to its requirement that the termination of
parental rights be in the best interest of the child. 213 For example, in In re
Michael E.,21 4 the New York Supreme Court affirmed the Family
Court's finding that it was not in the child's best interests to sever the
parent-child relationship where both the mother and her seventeen-yearold son were intellectually disabled. 21 5 The decision stated, "[G]iven the
likelihood of Michael never being adopted and the loving relationship
between

him

and

respondent... depriving

him of contact

with

respondent would serve no legitimate purpose or be in his best
interest.''2 16 Yet, the presence of cognitive disabilities in both parent and
child has led some courts to terminate parental rights, based on a finding
that the mentally delayed parent is especially ill equipped to care for a
mentally delayed child.2 17
D.

Effect of Not Terminating ParentalRights

Failing to make a timely termination of parental rights or to sever
an abusive parent-child relationship may also harm children. After being
removed, children are put into some form of foster care to await a court
determination. Fifteen months 21 8 is a short time for a mentally delayed
parent to overcome the difficulties that led to the removal, but this is a
long time for children to be in a system that can cause physical and
emotional harm.
The foster care system is meant to offer security to children, but it
often does the opposite. While there are many excellent foster parents,
there is also abuse of children in care by both foster parents and other

212. See FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 14.

213. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(C) (2005).
214. 659 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).

215. Id.at 579, 591.
216. Id. at579.
217. See, e.g., In re Curry, No. 03CA51, 2004 WL 307476, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 11,

2004) (finding that the mother's mental disabilities prevented her from appropriately addressing her
children's developmental delays).
218. Referring to the ASFA requirement adopted by each state that termination proceedings be
initiated if a child has been in care for fifteen of the past twenty-two months. See, e.g., MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-604 (2005).
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foster children. 21 9 A national report on child fatalities found that a child
in foster care is twice as likely to die from abuse as is a child in the
general population of children.220 New Jersey parents whose children
were removed due to inadequate housing sued because their children
returned from foster care with clear signs of physical abuse.2 2' Long
stints in foster care often involve moving between multiple foster homes,
with children experiencing disruptions in schooling and relationships.222
These constant changes make it difficult to develop and maintain
connections that are crucial to a child's growth.223
In making and enforcing child welfare legislation, there is always
the fear that a child may be hurt because the law was not stringent
enough. Legislators face accusations that children are slipping through
holes in the law and are being returned to abusive homes to face further
harm or death.224 Yet, this should not be a concern in relation to
removing mental retardation or deficiency as grounds for removing
children. As discussed above,225 statutes have sufficient nets to catch

parents who are mistreating their children, whether or not the parent has
a mental delay. If a mentally delayed parent has abandoned, neglected,
or abused her child, state statutes allow for termination on that basis
alone.226 More is not necessary or useful.
V.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES

Targeting parents with mental disabilities in termination of parental
rights statutes is potentially unconstitutional under both the Americans
with Disabilities Act and substantive due process. Yet, in practice,

219.

Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales From the Age ofASFA, 36 NEW. ENG. L.

REv. 129, 138 (2001).
220. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SER., ADMIN. ON CHILD., YOUTH AND FAMILIES:

CHILD MALTREATMENT 1999 at VIII, 41 (2001).
221. See Jennifer V. Hughes, Lawsuit Says DYFS OrderedFalse Reports-Caseworker Claims
He Was Firedfor Refusing, THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), May 4, 2001, at L3.
222.

See GLORIA HOCHMAN ET AL., PEW COMM'N ON FOSTER CARE, VOICES FROM THE

INSIDE, 5-6 (Feb. 2004).
223. See id. at 7.
224. See Child Protection: Talk Is Way Too Cheap, THE SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr.
3, 2005, at D2 ("Current law lets many children slip through the cracks repeatedly before the state
takes strong action.").
225. See supra notes 117-47 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., NEB. REV STAT. § 43-292 (LexisNexis 2004) ("The court may terminate all
parental rights between the parents or the mother of a juvenile born out of wedlock and such
juvenile when.., it appears by the evidence that one or more of the following conditions
exist ... parents have abandoned.., neglected.., neglected to provide the juvenile with the
necessary subsistence, education, or other care.").
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neither of these have afforded disabled parents protection from the
misuse of termination of parental rights or have successfully overturned
a state statute. Although this does not preclude their effective use in the
future, it does demonstrate the need to change the statutes and prevent
discrimination, rather than force parents to attempt to remedy it on the
back end.
The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits public entities from
discriminating on the basis of a disability, 227 and many of the parties
involved in a termination of parental rights proceeding would be
included under this umbrella: Child Protective Services, state and local
courts, and state child welfare agencies.22 8 It follows that the ADA
should apply and that delayed parents who have had their rights
terminated on basis of their delays should have a strong cause of action.
However, actions appealing a termination of parental rights under
the ADA have not been successful. In Bartell v. Lohiser,229 the court
found that the ADA does not require a state to ignore a parent's
disability in assessing her ability to raise her child 230 and that the
defendants were immune from suit. 23 1 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding, finding that the
state did not violate the mother's constitutional right to raise her child
232
because the state's interest in the child was greater than the mother's.
In Morrison v. Commissioner of Special Services,2 3 3 involving a
mentally ill mother's claim that her rights had been unfairly terminated,
234
the court laid out a four-part test to assess an alleged ADA violation.
The parent failed under the second prong of this test, requiring that the
plaintiff be "otherwise qualified" for the benefit, because the court found
that she was not qualified to be a parent.235
Another potential route to finding the termination statutes
unconstitutional is under the Equal Protection Clause, using intellectual

227. See42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2005).
228. See Kerr, supra note 115, at 410.
229. 12 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
230. Id. at 650.
231. Id. at 645-46.
232. 215 F.3d 550, 558, 559 (6th Cir. 2000).
233. No. CV 94-5796, 1996 WL 684426, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1996).
234. The plaintiff must show: "(1) that she has a disability, (2) that she is 'otherwise qualified'
for the benefit ... (3) that she was either excluded from participation ... or was otherwise
discriminated against ... and (4) that such discrimination was by reason of plaintiff's disability." Id.
at *4.
235. Id.
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disability as a suspect class.236 In a leading case, City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center,237 the United States Supreme Court found that it
was a violation of equal protection to deny a permit to a residential
center for people with mental retardation.2 38 The court defined the clause
as "a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike ' 239 and found that there was no rational basis 240 for requiring a
special permit for the residence. Instead the requirement was used for the
impermissible reason of discriminating against the mentally delayed.241
Yet, despite this case's potential to provide support for cognitively
delayed parents claiming discrimination and differential treatment under
the termination statutes, equal protection claims have failed on the state
level.
Although a circuit court found that Illinois' Adoption Act, defining
as "unfit" a parent who cannot fulfill parental responsibilities due to
retardation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause,242
the Illinois Supreme Court overruled the decision in In re R. C.243 The
court found that parents with cognitive delays are not similarly situated
to parents who do not have mental delays and so the Equal Protection
Clause did not apply.244 Similarly, an Ohio appeals court found that the
state statute allowing for termination of parental rights on the basis of
parental delays did not violate equal protection. 245 In New York, the
Family Court did find that a cognitively delayed parent must be treated
the same as other allegedly neglectful parents under an equal protection

236. Scholars have called disability a racial issue, raising the potential for this classification to
be used in equal protection cases. See, e.g., Ferri
& Connor, supra note 14, at 74. However, it does
not appear that this connection has been highlighted in the case law, though the implications are
especially troubling in termination of parental rights cases because racial minorities are already
over-represented in the child welfare sector. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Racial Disproportionalityin
the U.S. Child Welfare System: Documentation, Research on Causes, and PromisingPractices,at 3
(Northwestern U. Sch. of Law, Inst. for Pol'y Research, Working Paper No. 4), available at
http://www.aecf.org/tarc/priority/respect/working_paper_4.pdf.
237. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
238. Id. at 432.
239. Id.at 439.
240. The Court did not find that the mentally retarded are a quasi-suspect class and so applied a
rational basis test. See id. at 446-47.
241. Id.at450.
242. 745 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (II. 2001).
243. Id.at 1246.
244. Id. at 1245.
245. See In re Moore, No. CA99-09-153, 2000 WL 1252028, *7-8 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5,

2000).
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analysis, but did not go so far as to find the state's termination statute
unconstitutional under equal protection.24 6
VI.

CONCLUSION

As the Supreme Court stated in Penry v. Lynaugh, intellectually
disabled people are individuals.247 Parents with mental delays comprise a
diverse group with differing abilities, but many share the ability to be an
effective, loving parent. Thus, each family must be analyzed individually
to see what effects the mental disability is having on the children and
whether the problems could be remedied by providing services instead
of severing the parent-child relationship. The statutes that are most
effective are those that look at mental delays as one of many factors in
determining the best outcome for the family. Bright-line rules are not as
necessary in family court as they are in other areas of law 248 because
what makes a "good parent" is not clearly defined. Thus, decisions must
be more attentive to the situation. Judges should be given the discretion
within outlined guidelines to make a decision that is in the child's true
best interests.
The statutes themselves need to evolve further to fit a modem
understanding of mentally delayed parents and to effectively meet these
statutes' stated goal of protecting children, either in their family of origin
or with an adoptive or foster family. By eliminating the classifications of
"mental deficiency" and "mental retardation" from their termination of
parental rights statutes, 249 the states will be removing a provision that is
discriminatory, based on out-moded thinking, and not protective of
children. It is not in the best interests of the child, the parent, or the state
to define unfitness with a characteristic that has no correlation to the
ability to parent.
Alexis C. Collentine*

246. See In re W.W. Children, 736 N.Y.S.2d 567, 577 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001).
247. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 306 (1989).
248. One example is criminal law, where rules serve both to provide warning and to draw the
necessary lines between right and wrong.
249. Previous articles have supported removing these classifications. See, e.g., Watkins, supra
note 203, at 1471.
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